Dr Sishuwa Sishuwa is a senior lecturer in the Department of History at the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences. His research focuses on the political history of southern Africa, with interests in elections, leadership, populism and democratic governance. Sishuwa has authored more than 20 peer-reviewed publications including in major African Studies journals and is the author of Party Politics and Populism in Zambia (James Currey, 2024). An Iso Lomso Fellow at STIAS, he is currently a visiting scholar at Harvard University, where he is completing his next book on why the military in the region upholds democracy in some countries, not others. 

What do you see as the most significant threats to democracy today?
The most significant threats to democracy today include gradual erosion through institutional capture by the executive. Many democracies are being hollowed out incrementally as elected leaders weaken oversight bodies, tilt the playing field, and entrench their advantage over time. Internationally, this process is reinforced by what might be described as an emerging illiberal international: a looser but increasingly influential network of authoritarian and hybrid regimes that share ideas, resources, and diplomatic cover.

This has made it easier for leaders to resist external pressure and harder for democracies to coordinate effective responses. In South Africa, the risks are more domestic but shaped by this wider context. Declining trust in institutions, the legacy of state capture and deep inequality have weakened confidence in democracy’s ability to deliver. At the same time, perceived closeness to actors such as Russia has raised concerns about foreign policy alignment and the diffusion of illiberal norms. These dynamics do not necessarily threaten immediate collapse, but they do erode the foundations of democratic stability over time.

Another concern is growing disinterest in promoting democracy among great powers such as the USA and the European Union, as well as regional powers including South Africa and organisations such as the African Union.

Disillusionment among citizens after decades of non-delivery and dishonesty also poses a threat. Democratic freedoms must be accompanied by tangible economic results such as jobs and food security. Otherwise, voters may reasonably ask: What does democracy deliver?

The rapid rise of oligarchy and inequality in the Global North, where the social democratic compromise continues to be eroded, is also cause for concern. In South Africa, we remain faced by the question of what the class forces behind the ANC will do when, as seems likely, they are seriously threatened by ejection from state power.

What happens when trust in democracy erodes, and how can it be rebuilt in polarised and unequal societies?
Trust is the glue that holds democracy together. When it erodes, citizens become more likely to disengage, question electoral outcomes, and support leaders who promise to bypass or undermine democratic rules. This can fuel polarisation and increase the risk of instability.

Rebuilding trust requires more than communication strategies. It depends on delivering tangible improvements in people’s lives, especially in contexts of high inequality, and on demonstrating that institutions operate fairly and consistently. Strengthening accountability mechanisms, tackling corruption, and creating meaningful channels for citizen engagement are all critical. In deeply unequal societies, trust is rebuilt not through rhetoric but through visible fairness and inclusion.

Rebuilding trust also depends on leadership, not just at the political level, but at the top of institutions. There is nothing like a bit of old-fashioned honesty, linked to humility and a willingness to be held accountable.

Young people are often described as disengaged from formal politics, yet active in social movements. How do you interpret this?
Young people are not disengaged so much as disillusioned with formal politics. Many continue to participate actively, but through protests, digital activism and issue-based campaigns rather than parties and elections. This reflects a growing perception that formal institutions are unresponsive or captured. While this shift can make politics more volatile, it also represents an opportunity. Youth activism has the potential to revitalise democratic participation, but only if institutions adapt by becoming more open, responsive and accountable. Without such adaptation, the gap between citizens and the state is likely to widen further.

Overall, I am sceptical that differences in participation by age have changed dramatically over time, although across much of Southern Africa later generations are less committed to democracy than earlier ones that lived through, or soon after, independence and had to fight for democratic rights such as voting. To address this, there is a serious need for further decentralisation and devolution of politics and the economy so that people can take greater control of their lives locally. Society is now too complicated to be systematically and sensibly controlled from the top, certainly not by a “vanguard” party.

How can technology and social media be harnessed to advance democracy rather than undermine it?
Technology is inherently double-edged. It can deepen polarisation, spread disinformation and undermine trust, particularly where institutions are already weak. At the same time, it can enhance transparency, facilitate mobilisation and enable new forms of accountability. The key question is governance. Technology strengthens democracy when it is embedded in credible institutions and supported by trusted sources of information. Where these conditions are absent, it tends to amplify existing weaknesses. The challenge is therefore less about the technology itself than about building the institutional and informational environments in which it operates.

There is also a greater need for better regulation of social media companies. Present attempts to control techno-oligarchs such as Elon Musk are manifestly feeble. They need to face serious regulation and heavy fines for failing to uphold democratic norms, inclusive politics and decent human behaviour.

What gives you hope for the future of democracy?
The persistence of democratic resistance from below is a source of hope. Even in difficult contexts, citizens, civil society organisations and social movements continue to mobilise in defence of accountability and rights. Another source of hope lies in the growing focus on democratic resilience. Increasingly, research and policy are shifting from simply preventing backsliding to understanding how democracies can recover and build back stronger. The most promising initiatives are those that combine institutional reform with deeper citizen engagement, recognising that democracy ultimately depends not just on formal rules but on trust, participation and legitimacy.

We should also look to recent elections in the subregion for examples of how citizens continue to retain a degree of trust in democracy’s power to facilitate peaceful change through the ballot. Citizens rejected incumbent governments in Zambia (2021), Malawi (2024), Botswana (2024) and South Africa (2024).

* This article forms part of a series highlighting academic perspectives on democracy. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Stellenbosch University. The University is committed to academic freedom and the open exchange of ideas.